Coquet.com

The timeline behind coquet.com

Registration, the decision and the archived record of what this domain actually displayed — from public RDAP and the Internet Archive.

Result of record. The panel's reasoning and decisive facts behind each element are in the Intelligence dossier below.

ARBITRATION AN D MEDIATION CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION Porcelaines JL Coquet v. Stanley Pace Case No. D2026-2380 1. The Parties The Complainant is Porcelaines JL Coquet, France, represented by Osborne Clarke Selas, France. The Respondent is Stanley Pace, United States of America, represented by John Berryhill, Ph.d., Esq., United States of America (“USA” or “US”). 2. The Domain Name and Registrar The disputed domain name <coquet.com> is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC (the “Reg istrar”). 3. Procedural History The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 2, 2026. On June 2, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request f or registrar verif ication in connection with the disputed domain name. On June 4, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verif ication response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which dif f ered f rom the named Respondent (Domains By Proxy LLC), and contact inf ormation in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on June 4, 2026, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant f iled an amended Complaint on June 8, 2026. The Center verif ied that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisf ied the f ormal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules f or Unif orm Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules f or Unif orm Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”). In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center f ormally notif ied the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on June 10, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was June 30, 2026. The Respondent requested a four day extension to submit the Response as per Paragraph 5(b) of the Rules, and the due date for Response was extended to July 4, 2026. The Response was f iled with the Center on July 4, 2026. page 2 The Center appointed Tobias Malte Müller as the sole panelist in this matter on July 20, 2026. The Panel f inds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7. 4. Factual Background The Complainant's uncontested evidence establishes that it acquired the company ETABLISSEMENTS COQUET in 2019 in the course of insolvency proceedings. ETABLISSEMENTS COQUET was a French company that had been manufacturing and marketing luxury porcelain, in France and internationally, since 1824. In 2010, J.L COQUET & Jaune de Chrome was awarded the prestigious French state label “Entreprise du Patrimoine Vivant” (“Living Heritage Company”), and its porcelain is certif ied under the Protected Geographical Indication for Limoges porcelain. In 2021, the Complainant presented the new “YSL Lif estyle collection” with the well-known fashion label Saint Laurent. Finally, the Complainant presented a bundle of exemplary international invoices on worldwide sales including sales to customers in the USA between 2005 and 2009 (located in Las Vegas, New Yo rk, Dallas, New Jersey, Bellevue and Wall Township). The Complainant's uncontested documentary evidence further establishes that it is the registered owner of several trademarks consisting of or containing the term COQUET, namely: (i) International trademark no. 972170 registered on June 30, 2008 and designating many jurisdictions, including the USA; (ii) French word trademark COQUET no. 1567712 registered on December 29, 1989; (iii) International semi-figurative trademark COQUET no. 586906 registered on June 15, 1992, designating many jurisdictions. The Complainant’s of f icial website is available under the domain name <jlcoquet.com>. The disputed domain name was f irst registered on May 2, 2000, apparently by a third person. According to the screenshot submitted by the Complainant, the disputed domain name resolves to a parking page displaying English language pay-per-click (“PPC”) links to third-party commercial websites relating to f ashion and accessories. The Respondent describes himself as a well-established domain name investor who owns a signif icant domain name portfolio including domain names that consist of personal names like the disputed domain name in the present case. It is common ground that the Respondent has been party to several prior UDRP proceedings administered by the Center; in some of those proceedings the respective panels ordered transfer of the disputed domain names, while in others the Respondent prevailed. 5. Parties’ Contentions A. Complainant The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy f or a transf er of the disputed domain name. Notably, the Complainant contends that: page 3 (1) The mere f act that the Complainant holds registered trademarks identical or confusingly similar to the disputed domain name is sufficient to satisfy the first element. The complete reproduction of a trademark within a disputed domain name is sufficient to establish confusing similarity. The Complainant further claims unregistered or common law trademarks in the terms “COQUET” and “JL COQUET”; (2) The term “coquet” incorporated in the disputed domain name is not a generic or common term, but a distinctive sign associated with the Complainant's COQUET Trademarks, trade names and domain names. Accordingly, the use of the disputed domain name to host parking pages or pay-per-click links cannot ground any rights or legitimate interests, and such commercial PPC use is indicative of commercial exploitation. Furthermore, the Respondent cannot be regarded as commonly known by the disputed domain name; (3) The Respondent offered the disputed domain name f or sale at a price well beyond out-of-pocket expenses. In support of this allegation, the Complainant submits five screenshots from the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine dated respectively 2001, 2003, 2010, October 2013 and April 2016 f rom which it results that the disputed domain name is of f ered f or sale without any concrete selling price being indicated. In January 2026 the Complainant contacted the Registrar through its parent company TVS Motors in order to enquire an eventual selling price. According to the correspondence on record, the Registrar informed that in the past, the owner of the disputed domain name has asked not to be contacted with any of f er of less than USD 200,000 which the Registrar defined as the minimum acceptable amount to reach out to the owner. The f inal asking price may be higher. The term “coquet” is distinctive of the Complainant’s porcelain and tableware products, which has been internationally well-known under this brand for decades. In support of this reputation claim, the Complainant provided a series of international press articles dated 1999-2025 on J.L Coquet porcelain. Theref ore, in the Complainant’s view, the Respondent knew or should have known that the disputed domain name is identical or conf usingly similar to the Complainant's COQUET Trademarks. Holding a domain name identical to a well-known distinctive trademark, combined with the display of PPC links and the offering of the disputed domain name for sale, creates a risk of traffic diversion and misleading association, and confers upon the Respondent a substantial capacity to cause harm to the Complainant. Finally, the Respondent has chosen to conceal his identity behind a privacy/proxy service, thereby preventing the Complainant f rom easily identif ying the Respondent and contacting it directly. B. Respondent The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not satisfied all three of the elements required under the Policy f or a transf er of the disputed domain name. Notably, the Respondent contends that: (1) there is no dispute between the parties that the Complainant has trademark rights in COQUET f or porcelain products. However, this does not confer the Complainant a monopoly in this widely-used term. There is no basis upon which the Complainant's rights extend to any use or commercialization of the term “coquet”, including by the Respondent. Accordingly, the Complainant is only one of many entities in France and worldwide, which use the surname “coquet” as a trade name and/or trademark f or various goods and services in a variety of geographic jurisdictions; (2) the disputed domain name has been legitimately registered consistent with the Respondent's longstanding pattern of dealing with dictionary words and surname domain names, f or which there is a clearer pattern and preponderance of evidence that is more reliable than the selective cases cited by the Complainant. The Complainant's own evidence shows the Respondent having used the domain name f or PPC advertising consistent with its dictionary def inition relating to f lirtatiousness and coquetry; page 4 (3) “Coquet” is a common and widely-concurrently-used and theref ore non-exclusive surname and dictionary word (of the English language) which the Respondent used f or purposes consistent with its ordinary meaning. Clearly, the disputed domain name is susceptible of substantial non-inf ringing use, and thus commercial value, for reasons having utterly nothing to do with the Complainant's limited trademark rights. The registration of the disputed domain name is consistent with the Respondent's registration of such domain names, and the Respondent's use of the domain name has not related in any way to the Complainant's trade in porcelain products. The Complainant cannot claim to be the special target of a public of fer for sale of this non-exclusive and non-distinctive word and surname, used by many businesses and persons. In any case, the Respondent registered the disputed domain name only since what appears to be mid-2013. While many varieties of f irewall sof tware do indeed block PPC advertising sites, there is no credible allegation that the Respondent - a f ully and correctly-identif ied individual with a well known reputation - is engaging in some kind of criminal malware distribution. The Respondent has no record of ever having been contacted by the Registrar and it appears that the Reg istrar may have been merely attempting to elicit a higher of f er to approach the Respondent. Finally, in the post-GDPR context every domain name registration has privacy applied by def ault. 6. Discussion and Findings Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable”. Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the f ollowing three elements in order to obtain an order that disputed domain name be transf erred or cancelled: (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad f aith. The Panel will theref ore proceed to analyze whether the three elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy are satisf ied. A. Identical or Confusingly Similar It is well accepted that the f irst element f unctions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name, WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”), section 1.7. As set out at section 4 above, the Complainant has demonstrated rights in the registered trademarks J.L COQUET and COQUET f or the purposes of the Policy (WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.2.1), most notably French word trademark COQUET No. 1567712. The second-level portion of the disputed domain name reproduces the Complainant’s COQUET trademark in its entirety and consists exclusively of that term. The generic Top-Level Domain “.com” is a standard registration requirement and is disregarded for the purposes of the confusing similarity assessment (WIPO page 5 Overview 3.1, section 1.11.1). Accordingly, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is identical to a trademark in which the Complainant has rights (WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.7). The Respondent's evidence that other persons or entities hold registered trademarks or company names incorporating the term “coquet” is not material at this stage: (eventual) coexistence of third-party rights does not diminish the Complainant’s standing under the f irst element. The Panel accordingly f inds that the f irst element of the Policy is satisf ied. B. Rights or Legitimate Interests Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which, if established, may demonstrate that the Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the dif f icult task of “proving a negative”, requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come f orward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent f ails to come f orward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element, WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.1. The disputed domain name resolves to a parking page displaying pay-per-click (PPC) links. The use of a domain name to host PPC links is not inherently illegitimate, and may support rights or legitimate interests where the links do not trade off a complainant’s trademark, WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.9 (see f or example, Rentsch Partner AG v. Stanley Pace, WIPO Case No . D2015-2302). The circumstances of each case must be considered. The unrebutted evidence establishes that J.L COQUET porcelain has a 200-year history and that the J.L COQUET mark has been used continuously for many decades, enjoying a reputation in the field of Limoges porcelain. The record further shows that the Complainant is among the few manufacturers entitled to use the Protected Geographical Indication for Limoges porcelain and was awarded the French state label “Entreprise du Patrimoine Vivant” (“Living Heritage Company”) in 2010. The Panel notes that the Complainant sells its porcelain also in the USA, as evidenced by the bundle of exemplary invoices certif ying sales to US customers in Las Vegas, New York, Dallas, New Jersey, Bellevue, and Wall Township between 2005 and 2009. Finally, the Panel has also taken into account a 2025 article in a US publication describing J.L. COQUET as the “prestigious, 200-year-old French porcelain house”; while this article postdates the registration of the disputed domain name, the Panel finds that it nevertheless corroborates the international recognition of the Complainant’s business. In light of the f oregoing, the Panel is satisf ied that the J.L COQUET mark had acquired a degree of recognition also in the USA p rior to the Respondent’s reg istration of the disputed domain name. The Panel f inds, however, that the record does not contain sufficient evidence that such recognition extends to the term COQUET standing alone. To the contrary, the above discussed evidence on record indicates that the Complainant and its mark are predominantly referred to as J.L COQUET, rather than as COQUET in isolation, a f act also ref lected in the domain name <jlcoquet.com>, which directs to the Complainant’s p rimary web site. Panels have consistently held that where a disputed domain name corresponding to a dictionary term i s used in a way that does not trade off a complainant’s trademark, whether to host links, content, a landing or sales page, or hosting no content at all, and where no other indicia of cybersquatting are present, such use may support the respondent’s claim to a right or legitimate interest, WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.10.1. In the present case, the PPC-links displayed on the parking page to which the disputed domain name resolves, relate to f ashion and accessories, b ut are unrelated to porcelain. This is undisputed amongst the Parties. page 6 The Panel does not overlook the evidence that the Complainant has collaborated with the well-known f ashion house Saint Laurent, reflecting a degree of af f inity between the porcelain and f ashion sectors, at least within the luxury segment. In the Panel’s view, however, this affinity is insufficient to support a f inding that the Respondent is trading off the Complainant's trademark by directing the disputed domain name to a website with f ashion-related PPC links. The Panel notes f urther that the Complainant has not adduced evidence of any other indicia of cybersquatting. In particular, the Panel notes that the term “coquet” carries a dictionary meaning (denoting f lirtatiousness or coquetry) and, as demonstrated by the Respondent, is also a French surname appearing in numerous third-party company names and trademarks in industries dif f erent f rom porcelain. Finally, the current use for not porcelain-related PPC links and the absence of any additional terms – relating to porcelain or the Complainant – in the disputed domain name support the Respondent’s claim not to have been aware of or targeting the Complainant’s mark. Against this background, the Panel finds that the Respondent’s reliance on the asserted dictionary meaning of “coquet” (denoting flirtatiousness or coquetry), together with the fact that it represents a French surname ref lected in third-party company names and trademarks, provides a plausible explanation f or the Respondent’s selection of the disputed domain name. The Panel f inds the second element of the Policy has not been established. C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith The Panel notes that, f or the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad f aith. The evidence on record does not indicate that the Respondent’s aim in registering the disputed domain name was to prof it f rom or exploit the Complainant’s specific COQUET trademark. 1. The Panel acknowledges that registering domain names for resale does not, in itself , evidence bad f aith, and that the availability of a dictionary meaning for “coquet” may support a legitimate explanation f or the registration. In its analysis, the Panel f urther takes into account that the Respondent is, by his own account, an experienced domain investor. In accordance with WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.2.2, a respondent's awareness of a complainant's mark may be inf erred f rom the totality of the circumstances, including the respondent’s sophistication, the nature of the domain name, and the reputation of the mark. Paragraph 2 of the Policy also places a responsibility on registrants to ensure that their “registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party”. Domainers or domain name investors are, moreover, generally held to a higher standard of due diligence when acquiring a domain name, WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.2.3 (also see DV Dinh Van v. Stanley Pace, WIPO Case No . D2025- 5361). In the light of the foregoing principles, the determinative question is whether, on the record bef ore it, the Panel is satisf ied that the Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad f aith on account of its value as a domain name corresponding to the Complainant's trademark. As set out at section 6.B above, the record demonstrates that, by mid-2013, when the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name, the J.L COQUET mark enjoyed a degree of reputation in the f ield of Limoges porcelain, resulting from decades of continuous use. The record does not demonstrate the same degree of reputation in COQUET alone, which the Respondent identifies as carrying a dictionary meaning, denoting f lirtatiousness or coquetry. The Respondent has f urther demonstrated that “coquet” is also a French surname appearing in numerous third-party company names and trademarks. Although the Respondent does not claim “Coquet” as his own name or trademark, he has nonetheless demonstrated that there exist numerous potential legitimate users of the “Coquet” name and mark. Finally, the Respondent is not using page 7 the disputed domain name in connection with products attributable to the Complainant, i.e. porcelain but rather PPC links related to f ashion. Against this background, the Panel is skeptical of the Complainant’s contention that the Respondent selected and acquired the disputed domain name by ref erence to Complainant’s mark, rather than f or legitimate speculation based on its claimed dictionary meaning. On the balance of probabilities, the Panel theref ore f inds it more likely than not that Respondent was not targeting the Complainant's COQUET mark and business at the time of registering the disputed domain name. 2. Finally, also the open public off er f or sale on the PPC page, displaying no asking price does not, without more, establish bad f aith. In f act, Panels have generally f ound that where a registrant has an independent right to or legitimate interest in a domain name, an offer to sell that domain name would not by itself be evidence of bad faith for purposes of the UDRP, irrespective of which party solicits the prospective sale. This also includes “generalized” offers to sell, including those on a third-party platf orm. Panels have noted in respect of UDRP paragraph 4(b)(i) that offers to sell which exceed the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs must target a trademark owner; assessment of such targeting will take account of all relevant f acts and circumstances, and of ten includes matters such as the strength of the mark at issue (including whether there may be third parties also using the term as a mark f or other goods/services including in other jurisdictions and whether it may also be descriptive or a dictionary term capable of non- inf ringing uses), the extent or reach of the complainant’s online presence, and the location of the parties. Mere of fers to sell for a profit, where this does not target a trademark owner would not be considered to violate paragraph 4(b)(i). WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.1.1. The record before the Panel indicates that the enquiry of January 2026 was sent not by the Complainant but by the Complainant’s parent company, TVS Motors. The Respondent disputes the domain broker’s account, according to which the Respondent had previously indicated a minimum acceptable of f er of USD 200,000, with the f inal asking price potentially higher. While the Respondent has not produced evidence suf f icient to displace the broker’s documented statements, the Panel does not consider this alone to establish bad f aith under paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy. The determinative question, however, is not the fact of that attribution but whether the price so communicated was f ixed with the Complainant or its mark specif ically in mind, rather than ref lecting the domain name's general market value. On this point, the record contains no evidence that the broker's counterparty was identified to the Respondent (or the broker) as affiliated with the Complainant, nor any other indication that the pricing was directed at the Complainant rather than at the market generally. The Panel also notes that this exchange was initiated by the Complainant’s parent company, rather than the Respondent specifically seeking out the Complainant or its parent company, and it is uncertain to what extent the broker acted outside of the Respondent’s knowledge or direction. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Respondent's offer for sale of the disputed domain name, considered together with the record as a whole, does not establish that the disputed domain name was registered or is being used in bad f aith. Based on the available record, the Panel f inds the third element of the Policy has not been established. D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking Although the Respondent did not expressly request a finding a Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”), noting the above findings the Panel will consider whether such a finding is appropriate pursuant to paragraph 15(e) of the Rules. Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if af ter considering the submissions, the Panel f inds that the Complaint was brought in bad f aith, f or example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad f aith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. page 8 On balance, the Panel declines to make a f inding of RDNH in this case. In the Panel’s view, the Complainant had a good faith basis to be concerned upon observing its trademark being used in connection with a domain name serving PPC advertising operated by a Respondent who had previously been involved in other UDRP proceedings. The response provided by the Respondent during this proceeding does not negate the bona fides of the Complainant’s initial concerns. It is acknowledged that the mere lack of success of the complaint is not, on its own, sufficient to constitute reverse domain name hijacking. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 4.16. The Panel f inds that the Complaint has not been brought in bad f aith and does theref ore not constitute an attempt at RDNH. 7. Decision For the f oregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied. /Tobias Malte Müller/ Tobias Malte Müller Sole Panelist Date: August 19, 2026

Source of record: WIPO . Reproduced for research; WIPO is the authoritative source.