Googlechromeos.com

The timeline behind googlechromeos.com

Registration, the decision and the archived record of what this domain actually displayed — from public RDAP and the Internet Archive.

Result of record. The panel's reasoning and decisive facts behind each element are in the Intelligence dossier below.

NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM DECISION Google Inc. v. Konstantin A Igumnov Claim Number: FA0912001297470 PARTIES Complainant is Google Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Meredith M. Pavia, California, USA. Respondent is Konstantin A. Igumnov (“Respondent”), Russia. REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME The domain name at issue is <googlechromeos.com>, registered with Centrohost Closed Joint Stock Company. PANEL The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding. James A. Carmody, Esq., as Panelist. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on December 3, 2009; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on December 4, 2009. On December 4, 2009, Centrohost Closed Joint Stock Company confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <googlechromeos.com> domain name is registered with Centrohost Closed Joint Stock Company and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Centrohost Closed Joint Stock Company has verified that Respondent is bound by the Centrohost Closed Joint Stock Company registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"). On December 4, 2009, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of December 24, 2009 by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@googlechromeos.com by e-mail. Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default. On January 4, 2010, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed James A. Carmody, Esq., as Panelist. Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent." Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent. RELIEF SOUGHT Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant. PARTIES' CONTENTIONS A. Complainant makes the following assertions: 1. Respondent’s <googlechromeos.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. 2. Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <googlechromeos.com> domain name. 3. Respondent registered and used the <googlechromeos.com> domain name in bad faith. B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding. FINDINGS Complainant, Google Inc., operates a well-known Internet search service as well as a wide range of other products and services. In particular, Complainant has offered a web browser called “Google Chrome” since September 2, 2009. Additionally, Complainant has announced its intention to release an operating system named “Google Chrome OS.” Complainant holds many registrations of the GOOGLE mark around the world, including several with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,806,075 issued January 20, 2004). Respondent, Konstantin A Igumnov, registered the <googlechromeos.com> domain name on February 7, 2009. Respondent has not put the disputed domain name to any active use and it currently resolves to an inactive website. Respondent offered to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for 1,000,000 rubles (approximately USD $33,000). DISCUSSION Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable." In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”). Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. Identical and/or Confusingly Similar The Panel finds that Complainant has established rights in its GOOGLE mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) via its multiple registrations of the mark throughout the world (e.g., USPTO Reg. No. 2,806,075 issued January 20, 2004). See Google, Inc. v. DktBot.org, FA 286993 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 4, 2004) (finding that the complainant had established rights in the GOOGLE mark through its holding of numerous trademark registrations around the world); see also Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Santos, FA 565685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 21, 2005) (finding trademark registration with the USPTO was adequate to establish rights pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). Further, registration in Respondent’s country of business is not necessary to establish Complainant’s rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that the mark be registered in the country in which the respondent operates; therefore it is sufficient that the complainant can demonstrate a mark in some jurisdiction); see also KCTS Television Inc. v. Get-on-the-Web Ltd., D2001-0154 (WIPO Apr. 20, 2001) (holding that it does not matter for the purpose of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy whether the complainant’s mark is registered in a country other than that of the respondent’s place of business). The <googlechromeos.com> domain name includes Complainant’s GOOGLE mark, the phrase “chrome os,” and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com.” The Panel finds that the addition of a gTLD is irrelevant to an analysis under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Isleworth Land Co. v. Lost in Space, SA, FA 117330 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 27, 2002) (“[I]t is a well established principle that generic top-level domains are irrelevant when conducting a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis.”). Further, the Panel finds that the words “chrome os” have an obvious relationship to Complainant’s business because they describe Complainant’s future operating system. The Panel therefore finds that the <googlechromeos.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Space Imaging LLC v. Brownell, AF-0298 (eResolution Sept. 22, 2000) (finding confusing similarity where the respondent’s domain name combines the complainant’s mark with a generic term that has an obvious relationship to the complainant’s business); see also Kohler Co. v. Curley, FA 890812 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 5, 2007) (finding confusing similarity where <kohlerbaths.com>, the disputed domain name, contained the complainant’s mark in its entirety adding “the descriptive term ‘baths,’ which is an obvious allusion to complainant’s business.”). The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Rights or Legitimate Interests The initial burden under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) is on Complainant to prove that Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Once Complainant has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests pursuant to the directions provided in Policy ¶ 4(c). See Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires v. Greenpeace Int’l, D2001-0376 (WIPO May 14, 2001) (“Proving that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name requires the Complainant to prove a negative. For the purposes of this sub paragraph, however, it is sufficient for the Complainant to show a prima facie case and the burden of proof is then shifted on to the shoulders of Respondent. In those circumstances, the common approach is for respondents to seek to bring themselves within one of the examples of paragraph 4(c) or put forward some other reason why they can fairly be said to have a relevant right or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name in question.”); see also Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (holding that once the complainant asserts that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests with respect to the domain, the burden shifts to the respondent to provide “concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name at issue”). The Panel finds that Complainant has presented a prima facie case, and in light of Respondent’s failure to submit a response the Panel now chooses to consider whether an evaluation of all the evidence demonstrates rights or legitimate interests for Respondent under Policy ¶ 4(c). The Panel finds no evidence in the record suggesting that Respondent is commonly known by the <googlechromeos.com> domain name. Complainant asserts that Respondent has no license or agreement with Complainant authorizing Respondent to use the GOOGLE mark, and the WHOIS information identifies Respondent as “Konstantin A Igumnov.” Thus, Respondent has not established rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) does not apply); see also Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Paik, FA 206396 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 22, 2003) (“Respondent has registered the domain name under the name ‘Ilyoup Paik a/k/a David Sanders.’ Given the WHOIS domain name registration information, Respondent is not commonly known by the [<awvacations.com>] domain name.”). Respondent has not posted anything on the website that resolves from the <googlechromeos.com> domain name. The Panel finds that Respondent’s failure to use the disputed domain name does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See Pharmacia & Upjohn AB v. Romero, D2000-1273 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where the respondent failed to submit a response to the complaint and had made no use of the domain name in question); see also Boeing Co. v. Bressi, D2000-1164 (WIPO Oct. 23, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where the respondent has advanced no basis on which the panel could conclude that it has a right or legitimate interest in the domain names, and no commercial use of the domain names has been established). Furthermore the Panel finds Respondent’s offer to sell the <googlechromeos.com> domain name to Complaintant is further evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. Hyun-Jun Shin, FA 154098 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (holding that under the circumstances, the respondent’s apparent willingness to dispose of its rights in the disputed domain name suggested that it lacked rights or legitimate interests in the domain name); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stork, D2000-0628 (WIPO Aug. 11, 2000) (finding the respondent’s conduct purporting to sell the domain name suggests it has no legitimate use). The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Registration and Use in Bad Faith Respondent offered to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for 1,000,000 rubles, approximately $33,000 United States dollars. The Panel finds that this offer to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for more than the out-of-pocket costs related to the registration of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). See Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. AchievementTec, Inc., FA 192316 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 15, 2003) (finding the respondent’s offer to sell the domain name for $2,000 sufficient evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i)); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Prijic, FA 112639 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 27, 2002) (“[I]n determining whether Respondent has sought consideration in excess of its out-of-pocket costs, the Policy makes clear that only costs related to the domain name are to be considered, and not those related to the creation or maintenance of the connected website”). The Panel finds Respondent’s failure to post anything on the website that resolves from the <googlechromeos.com> domain name is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that failure to use a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith); see also Cruzeiro Licenciamentos Ltda. v. Sallen, D2000-0715 (WIPO Sept. 6, 2000) (“Mere [failure to use] a domain name can qualify as bad faith if the domain name owner’s conduct creates the impression that the name is for sale.”). The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). DECISION Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED. Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <googlechromeos.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant. James A. Carmody, Esq., Panelist Dated: January 15, 2010 Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page. Click Here to return to our Home Page NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM

Source of record: FORUM . Reproduced for research; FORUM is the authoritative source.