Prevagens.com

The timeline behind prevagens.com

Registration, the decision and the archived record of what this domain actually displayed — from public RDAP and the Internet Archive.

Result of record. The panel's reasoning and decisive facts behind each element are in the Intelligence dossier below.

NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM DECISION Quincy Bioscience, LLC v. Zhang Xing Man Claim Number: FA2506002161047 PARTIES Complainant is Quincy Bioscience, LLC ("Complainant"), represented by Ryan Kaiser of Amin Wasserman Gurnani, LLP, Illinois, USA. Respondent is Zhang Xing Man ("Respondent"), China. REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME The domain name at issue is <prevagens.com>, registered with DNSPod, Inc. PANEL The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding. Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on June 16, 2025; Forum received payment on June 16, 2025. On June 19, 2025, DNSPod, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <prevagens.com> domain name is registered with DNSPod, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. DNSPod, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the DNSPod, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"). On June 20, 2025, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Chinese and English Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of July 10, 2025 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@prevagens.com. Also on June 20, 2025, the Chinese and English Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts. Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default in Chinese and English. On July 11, 2025, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist. Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response or any other submittal from Respondent. RELIEF SOUGHT Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: Language of The Proceeding According to the registrar, the registration agreement is written in Chinese. Rule 11(a) provides that the language of the proceedings is the language of the registration agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Complainant filed its Amended Complaint in English and requests that these proceedings be conducted in English. Factors which previous panels have seen as important include potential unfairness or unwarranted delay in ordering translation of the pleadings and the Decision, and evidence showing that the respondent can understand the language of the complaint, the language of the domain name, the content on any web pages resolving from the domain name, and prior correspondence between the parties. The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.5.1. The WIPO Overview is not a definitive statement of applicable law which governs any particular issue, but it does express a consensus among a significant number of UDRP panelists as to how particular issues typically are and should be resolved. The Panel accepts that consensus on this and other issues addressed later in this Decision. See also, The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language), Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, "It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case."). In this case, the domain name is written in English and targets an English-language U.S.-based firm. The website to which it resolves is written exclusively in English (screenshots submitted as Complaint Exhibit A). These factors demonstrate that Respondent is proficient in English. Neither the Panel nor the Complainant is proficient in Chinese. The Written Notice of the Complaint, written in both Chinese and English, was served upon Respondent in accordance with Rules 1 and 2. Respondent has not submitted a Response or any indication that it desires to participate in this proceeding, in Chinese or otherwise. Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the additional time and expense of proceeding in Chinese would be unwarranted inasmuch as the only party who might benefit from that has declined to participate. Adidas AG v. Daehyeon Kim, WIPO Case No. 2013-1904 ("In the present case, the Respondent waived any objection to proceeding in English by failing to respond to the Center's notice sent in both English and Korean."). For the reasons above set forth, this proceeding will be conducted in English. PARTIES' CONTENTIONS A. Complainant Complainant markets dietary supplements for, inter alia, the support of cognitive functions. It has rights in the PREVAGEN mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Respondent's <prevagens.com> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the PREVAGEN mark as it incorporates the entire mark. Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. It is not associated or affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, Complainant has priority over Respondent because it acquired rights in its mark long before Respondent registered the domain name, and Respondent is using the domain name for illegal activity by impersonating Complainant and purporting to offer Complainant's products. Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith. It is using the domain name to attract for commercial gain Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, it passes off as Complainant, and it had actual notice of Complainant's mark when it registered the domain name. B. Respondent Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding. FINDINGS Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable." Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name: (1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) ("Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint"), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 ("In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent's default—a complainant has failed to prove its case."). ."). The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding: Identical and/or Confusingly Similar The PREVAGEN mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 3,340,744) on December 4, 2007 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit B). Complainant's USPTO registration establishes its rights in the mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) ("Complainant's ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrates its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)."). Respondent's <prevagens.com> domain name is virtually identical to Complainant's PREVAGEN mark except for a subtle misspelling (adding an "s" at the end of the mark in the domain name) and the addition of the ".com" gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the domain name from Complainant's mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). HotelEngine, Inc. v. Jack Jones / Maryland Treatment Centers, Inc., FA 2122576 (Forum Nov. 20, 2024) (finding that hoteleengine.com is confusingly similar to the HOTEL ENGINE trade mark because the domain name consisted of a common misspelling of the mark by merely adding an additional letter 'E'), Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association v. Shi Lei aka Shilei, FA 1784643 (Forum June 18, 2018) ("A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs."). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity "typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name." Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant's mark is clearly recognizable within the domain name. For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the PREVAGEN mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights. Rights or Legitimate Interests If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) ("Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests."). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1. Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii): (i) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or (ii) the respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or (iii) (iii) the respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue. Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) it is not associated or affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, (ii) Complainant has priority over Respondent because it acquired rights in its mark long before Respondent registered the domain name, and (iii) Respondent is using the domain name for illegal activity by impersonating Complainant and purporting to offer Complainant's products. These allegations are addressed as follows: Complainant states that Respondent is not associated or connected with Complainant and that it has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its PREVAGEN mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement. It is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel and is taken as true. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant's mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant's mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) ("Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant's trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name."). Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name in part because it registered the domain name long after Complainant acquired rights in its mark. This fact is certainly relevant but in and of itself would not be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of no rights or legitimate interests. The plain language of Policy ¶ 4(c) provides that a respondent can demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a domain name if it proves that any one of the three sets of circumstances listed in subparagraphs (i) through (iii) of ¶ 4(c) is present. Notwithstanding the fact that a complainant acquired rights in an incorporated mark before the respondent registered the domain name, the complainant must still offer evidence on the three subparagraphs of Policy ¶ 4(c) in order to establish a prima facie case. Complaint Exhibit A is a screenshot of the website resolving from the domain name. It displays Complainant's PREVAGEN mark and registered logo (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit B), represents itself as the website of Complainant, and advertises and purports to offer Complainant's Prevagen product for sale. Complainant offered no screenshots or other evidence of its own website but its allegation that it provides the Prevagen product is not disputed and is corroborated by the description of the goods for which the PREVAGEN mark is registered with the USPTO (registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit B). That allegation is taken as true. Nowhere does Respondent's website state or even suggest that it is not Complainant's website. The copyright notation at the end of the website reads "© 2025 Prevagen." Respondent's website unquestionably represents itself and passes off as Complainant's. Passing off as a complainant and offering to sell that complainant's products does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) ("The usage of Complainant's NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name."), Ripple Labs Inc. v. NGYEN NGOC PHUONG THAO, FA 1741737 (Forum Aug. 21, 2017) ("Respondent uses the [disputed] domain name to divert Internet users to Respondent's website… confusing them into believing that some sort of affiliation exists between it and Complainant… [which] is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)."). Complainant did not address the Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) factor but the WHOIS information provided to Forum by the registrar lists the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. This name bears no resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the Domain Name or respondent's use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA 1574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). Further, although not argued by Complainant, by registering the domain name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant's mark, i.e., adding an "s" at the end of the mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Registering a typosquatted domain name evidences a lack of rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA 1610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) ("Users might mistakenly reach Respondent's resolving website by misspelling Complainant's mark. Taking advantage of Internet users' typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent's lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)."); Morgan Stanley Domestic Holdings, LLC v. tian xing guo an ke ji you xian gong si, FA 2093734 (Forum May 15, 2024) (The Panel finds that making the disputed domain names plural does not obviate the confusing similarity between the disputed domain names and Complainant's marks.). On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. Registration and Use in Bad Faith Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) requires Complainant to prove that the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows: (i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or (ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or (iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or (iv) (iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent 's web site or location. The concept of bad faith as illustrated in the above four subparagraphs necessarily involves a subjective intent on the part of a respondent knowingly to trade upon the goodwill of the complainant. The respondent must intentionally have targeted the complainant's mark. Such subjective intent would in turn require that the respondent actually knew of the complainant and its rights in the relevant mark when it registered the domain name. Renu Medispa, LLC v Angela Sattler/Aesthetics, FA 2143814 (Forum Apr. 28, 2025) ("A foundational question under ¶ 4(a)(iii) is whether or not Respondent had knowledge of Complainant or its claimed trademark at the time it registered the disputed domain name."). In attempting to discern actual knowledge and a subjective bad faith intent, panels have looked at many different types of evidence, including but not limited to use of a domain name in direct competition with a trademark owner, impersonation, the parties operating in the same market segment, the parties being physically located in the same general geographic area, a pattern of bad faith conduct, actual prior association between or among the parties, and the distinctive or famous nature of the trademark, suggesting that any similarity is not happenstance. Importantly, allegations about a respondent's subjective intention are not evidence in this regard. In cases where no Response has been filed, it can sometimes be difficult to determine whether a respondent registered a domain name with actual knowledge of the complainant and its rights in the mark. In this case, however, it is abundantly clear that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name in June 2025.1 Respondent's site represents itself as that of Complainant and advertises and purports to offer Complainant's products for sale. In order to impersonate Complainant, Respondent must have had the requisite actual knowledge. Respondent's registration of the domain name was no happenstance. It had actual knowledge of Complainant's rights in the incorporated mark when it registered the domain name. This, together with the obvious impersonation, is clear evidence of an intent to target this Complainant and its mark. The evidence of Respondent's conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, by passing off as Complainant and offering to sell products advertised as those of Complainant, Respondent is using the confusingly similar domain name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site. This conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA 1612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) ("The Panel agrees that Respondent's use of the website to display products similar to Complainant's, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)."). As discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to pass off as Complainant. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (Jan. 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum Dec. 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant."). Finally, as discussed above, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), typosquatting has also, in and of itself, been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use. Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant's mark with small typographical errors introduced therein). For the reasons above set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). DECISION Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED. Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <prevagens.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant. Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist July 14, 2025 [1] Complainant did not offer a WHOIS printout so the Panel has no direct evidence of when the domain name was registered, but the Complainant's unsupported allegation of a June 5, 2025 registration date is not contradicted by any evidence in the record and is corroborated to some extent by the June 5, 2026 expiration date shown in the information furnished to FORUM by the registrar. Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page. Click Here to return to our Home Page

Source of record: FORUM . Reproduced for research; FORUM is the authoritative source.